

Undemocratic Elections
PLSC 44902
University of Chicago
Spring 2013

Professor: Alberto Simpser
asimpser@uchicago.edu

Office Hours: Thursday, 3:30-5:30
Office: Pick Hall 517

Course Time: Tuesday, 3:00 to 5:50

Location: Harper 150

Course website: chalk.uchicago.edu

Please check Chalk website weekly for possible syllabus updates

Overview

Most elections held in the world today fall short of democratic standards. What are the different ways in which elections are undermined as instruments of accountability? What are the causes of electoral manipulation? What are the broader socio-economic consequences of a corrupt electoral system? Under what conditions are domestic and international pressures to hold free and fair elections effective? We will cover recent empirical and theoretical work bearing on these questions, drawing from the experience of a wide range of countries.

Mechanics of the Course

Preparation and Participation: The course is conceived as a discussion seminar. Students are expected to have read the assigned material and thought critically about it before each class meeting. In-class participation is essential, I will not lecture.

Assignments:

- (1) Every student will make two in-class presentations of an article or book chapter not in the syllabus, to be assigned by me.
- (2) A final research paper, due on **June 10**.

The in-class presentation should constitute a critical assessment of the readings. It should point out the strengths and weaknesses of the existing claims, theories, and evidence: what aspects of the question at hand does the literature answer well, or fail to answer? What is satisfying or unsatisfying, persuasive or unpersuasive, about the readings? A brief summary of the reading can be part of the presentation. You may wish to bring printed handouts for everyone in the class to follow. You will have 10 minutes to present in class (I will keep time strictly), followed by questions from the group.

The final research paper must cover a topic related to the course. The topic must be approved by me by the first week of May. The paper should be 12-15 pages long. For all assignments, please use standard margins, double spacing, and standard font size (12 pt).

Grading: Course grades will be calculated using the following weights: class participation 20%; in-class presentation(s) 30%; final paper 50%. **If you need to have your final grade by a particular date (e.g. due to graduation), please let me know on the first day of class to plan accordingly.**

Syllabus

All journal articles are available online. Some require use of the University Library's subscription. Book chapters not available online will be available on electronic reserve, through the Chalk website (under "Library Course Reserves").

April 2: What is electoral manipulation? Electoral fraud, electoral corruption, electoral malfeasance, patronage, and clientelism.

- Robert Dahl. 1971. *Polyarchy: participation and opposition*, Ch. 1 (pp.1-16).
Andreas Schedler. 2002. "The menu of manipulation," *Journal of Democracy*.
Susan C. Stokes. 2007. "Political clientelism," *Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Oxford University Press.

April 9: How do we know? Empirical evidence on electoral manipulation

- Gary Cox and Morgan Kousser. 1981. "Turnout and Rural Corruption: New York as a Test Case." *American Journal of Political Science*.
Fabrice Lehoucq and Ivan Molina. 2002. *Stuffing the Ballot Box*. Cambridge University Press (pp.1-19).
Mikhail Myagkov et al. 2009. *The forensics of election fraud: Russia and Ukraine*. Cambridge University Press (pp.1-47).
Gregory L. White and Rob Barry. 2011. "Russia's dubious vote," *The Wall Street Journal*, December 28, p.A1. (Note: this is a newspaper article)
Alberto Simpser. 2013. *Why parties and governments manipulate elections: theory, practice, and implications*. Cambridge University Press. (Ch. 2, sections 2.1-2.3).

April 16: Causes of electoral manipulation

- Peter Argersinger. 1985. "New perspectives on election fraud in the gilded age," *Political Science Quarterly*.
Fabrice Lehoucq. 2003. "Electoral fraud: causes, types and consequences," *Annual Review of Political Science*.
Alberto Simpser. 2013. *Why parties and governments manipulate elections: theory, practice, and implications*. Cambridge University Press. (Ch. 1, 4, and 5).

April 23: Formal institutions and incentives to manipulate

- John M Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: a rank ordering of electoral formulas," *Electoral Studies*.
- Allen Hicken. 2007. "How do rules and institutions encourage vote buying?" in Schaffer, ed., *Elections for Sale*, Cornell University Press. [you can find the chapter at: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~ahicken/index_files/votebuying.pdf]
- Sarah Birch. 2007. "Electoral systems and electoral misconduct," *Comparative Political Studies*.
- Sarah Birch. 2008. "Electoral institutions and popular confidence in the electoral process," *Electoral Studies*.
- Alberto Simpser. 2013. *Why parties and governments manipulate elections: theory, practice, and implications*. Cambridge University Press. (Ch. 2, section 2.4).

April 30: Vote buying and the organization of electoral manipulation

- Chin-Shou Wang and Charles Kurzman. 2008. "The logistics: how to buy votes," in Frederic Charles Schaffer, ed. 2008. *Elections for Sale*. Cornell University Press. Ch. 5 (pp.61-80).
- Barry Ames. 1971. "Bases of support for Mexico's dominant party," *American Political Science Review*.
- Wilson, Andrew. 2005. *Virtual politics: faking democracy in the post-Soviet world*, Yale University Press. Ch. 4 (pp.73-88).
- Mariela Szwarcberg. 2009. "Making local democracy: political machines, clientelism, and social networks in Latin America," mimeo, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, September.

May 7: Electoral manipulation and political and economic development

- Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism*. Cambridge University Press (Ch.1).
- Jean-Marie Baland and James Robinson. 2008. "How does vote buying shape the economy?" in Frederic Charles Schaffer, ed. 2008. *Elections for Sale*. Cornell University Press. Ch. 8 (pp.123-144).
- Alexander Libman. 2011. "Democracy, size of bureaucracy, and economic growth: evidence from Russian regions," *Empirical Economics*.

Jonathan Hiskey. 2005. “The political economy of subnational economic recovery in Mexico,” *Latin American Research Review*.

May 14: Election monitoring and electoral manipulation

Bjornlund, Eric. 2004. *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy*. Ch 3 (pp.31-49).

Kelley, Judith. 2009. “D-minus elections: the politics and norms of international election observation,” *International Organization*.

Nahomi Ichino and Matthias Schundeln. 2012. “Deterring or displacing electoral irregularities? Spillover effects of observers in a randomized field experiment in Ghana,” *Journal of Politics*.

Alberto Simpser and Daniela Donno. 2012. “Unintended consequences of election monitoring” *Journal of Politics*.

May 21: Electoral manipulation and popular unrest

James Fearon. 2011. “Self-enforcing democracy,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.

Joshua Tucker. 2007. “Enough! Electoral fraud, collective action problems, and post-Communist colored revolutions,” *Perspectives on Politics*.

Lucan Way. 2008. “The real causes of the colored revolutions,” *Journal of Democracy*.

Leonardo R. Arriola and Chelsea Johnson. 2012. “Election violence in democratizing states,” mimeo, University of California, Berkeley.

May 28: Electoral manipulation, voter participation, and electoral reform

Frederic Charles Schaffer. 2008. *The hidden costs of clean election reform*, Cornell University Press. Ch. 1 (pp.1-20).

Stephen Ansolabehere and Nathaniel Persily. 2008. “Vote fraud in the eye of the beholder: the role of public opinion in the challenge to voter identification requirements,” *Harvard Law Review*.

Alberto Simpser. 2012. “Does electoral manipulation reduce voter turnout?” *Journal of Politics*.

Aker et al. 2011. “Is information power? Using cell phones during an election in Mozambique,” *World Development*

June 4: Buffer Class TBD

June 6-7: Reading Period

June 10: **Final paper due**